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Abstract 
Using data for the 2000s, this paper explores the impact of foreign aid and the percentage of women in parliament on 
corruption. In doing so, it combines the aid – corruption literature with the literature that addresses the impact of 
gender on corruption. We also inquire if aid is more effective in countries with a larger participation of women in 
parliament. We find that neither aid nor the percentage of women in parliament affects perceived corruption in a 
significant way. Moreover, the impact of aid on corruption does not seem to be affected by the share of women in 
parliament.On the other hand,a long-established democracy is consistently found to be significant in affecting 
corruption.Our results are robust to various specifications, alternative measures of corruption and use of estimation 
techniques.
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1.   Introduction 
Corruption  is  usually  defined  or  understood  as  the  misuse  of  public  office/property  for 
personal/private  gain  (See,  for  example,  Shleifer  et  al.  1993,  Svensson  2005,  and  Treisman 
2007).  In line with  the main purpose of our paper,  however, we will use the  Political  Risk 
Services  (PRS)  Group‟s  definition  of  corruption  which  states  that  corruption  is  “a  threat  to 
foreign investment by distorting the economic and financial environment, reducing the efficiency 
of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage 
rather than ability, and introducing inherent instability into the political process.”
1 This definition 
reflects the fact that corruption is a multifaceted variable which can affect and be affected by a 
number of factors.  
  
In this paper we look at the impact of foreign aid and political gender equality (measured as the 
percentage of women in  parliament)  on corruption.  In doing so,  we  combine two important 
topics in the corruption literature. The first one relates foreign aid to corruption and the other 
looks at the impact of gender on corruption. The existing literature tries to address the impact of 
one of these variables without controlling for the other. Moreover, partly because of lack of 
compelling  theory  to  guide  the  selection  of  control  variables,  different  studies  use  different 
specifications controlling for different sets of variables which makes comparison of the existing 
results difficult. This paper attempts to fill the gap in the literature by introducing both foreign 
aid  and  gender  in  a  framework  established  by  Serra  (2008).  Using  a  “Global  Sensitivity 
Analysis” based on the E. E. Leamer‟s Extreme-Bounds Analysis, Serra (2008) has identified 
five variables that are robustly correlated to corruption. These variables are per capita GDP, 
protestant religion, colonial/legal heritage, democracy, and political stability. 
 
We construct the baseline model using those five variables and add foreign aid and women‟s 
participation in government. Moreover, we argue that if women‟s involvement in politics helps 
curtail corruption (as argued by Dollar et al. 2001) and if one major reason for foreign aid‟s 
ineffectiveness is corruption as in Rajan and Subramanian (2007), then, it is possible that foreign 
aid is more effective in those counties with larger participation of women in politics. To capture 
this idea, we interacted aid and a measure of women participation. This primarily accounts for 
our paper‟s novelty. 
 
1.1 Gender and Corruption 
A  rational  for  the  possible  impact  of  gender  on  corruption  is  the  idea  that  women  are  less 
individually  oriented  than  men  (Dollar  et  al.  2001).  Moreover,  members  of  parliament  may 
influence the level of corruption through the passage of laws or executive branch appointments 
or through making the process more visible to the public (Swamy et al. 2001). Based on the 
literature on behavioral studies, Dollar et al. (2001) argue that women should be particularly 
effective in promoting honest government. Their empirical results also show that “the greater the 
representation of women in parliament, the lower the level of corruption”. Swamy et al. (2001) 
also find that corruption is less severe in countries where a higher percentage of women are a 
larger part of the government and labor force.  The simple policy implication of these two major 
studies is to increase the participation of women in government in order to reduce corruption. 
                                                           





Sung  (2003),  however,  argues  that  although  female  participation  in  government  may  be 
correlated to lower levels of corruption, the relationship looses significance if one controls for 
the effects of constitutional liberalism or functioning liberal democratic institutions.  Using a 
panel  of  U.S.  states,  Cheung  and  Hernandez-Julian  (2006)  find  no  significant  relationship 
between gender and government corruption. More recently, using economic experiments, Alatas 
et al. (2009) find Australian men to be more likely to engage in corruption than are Australian 
women. However, they find no systematic gender differences in India, Indonesia, and Singapore. 
They conclude that gender differences in attitudes toward corruption appear not to be as robust 
and may be culture specific. On the other hand, Michailova and Melnykovska (2009) provide 
evidence of a negative relationship between corruption and increased representation of women in 
parliament in transition economies.  
 
1.2 Foreign Aid and Corruption 
The recent literature on foreign aid casts doubt as to its effectiveness especially in bringing about 
growth (see for example, Easterly (2003, 2009) and Rajan and Subramanian 2008). One major 
reason usually given for the ineptness of foreign aid is that it is diverted away by some recipient 
countries through corruption (Okonjo-Iweala 2007). In a similar vein, Rajan and Subramanian 
(2007) argue that aid may be associated with weak governance perhaps because the inflow of aid 
reduces recipient governments‟ incentive to tax the people. Djankov et al (2009) establish a 
negative relationship between donor fragmentation and the effectiveness of aid. They argue that 
part of the reason for such a negative relationship is that donor fragmentation is associated with 
increased corruption in the recipient country‟s government. 
 
 Empirical  studies  that  directly  link  aid  and  corruption  have  also  provided  evidence  that 
corruption  is  associated  with  considerable  cost  to  an  economy
2  (Knack and  Keefer  1995). 
Saxtson (2009)  cited  some  of the reasons why aid may increase corruption :  can strengthen 
existing public sector  bureaucracy; result in larger government spending an d a larger public 
sector (relative to the private sector); promote more rent seeking activity ; entrench a corrupt 
status quo elite; and foster delays in reforming existing corruption.  
 
There are, however, some works that provide evidence that aid can actu ally reduce corruption 
(Tavares 2003, Dunning 2004, and Ear 2006). Tavares (2003), for example, cites conditionality 
and liquidity effects as potential explanation s  as to why aid might be helpful in reducing 
corruption.  Charron (2009) finds that multilateral  aid is more effective than bilateral aid in 
improving governance and fighting against corruption in a developing country.   Charron also 
points out the importance of time period in which the relationship between aid and corruption 
has been studied.  In a slightly different line of literature, Alesina and Weder (2002) find no 
evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid”
3. Croix and Delavallade (2010) 
argue that if there is any relationship between aid and corruption, that relationship is positive. 
Using a simple model, they show how giving more aid to more corrupt countries (a positive 
relationship) might be optimal where the heterogeneity in productivity is more important among 
developing countries than the heterogeneity in the quality of institutions. 
                                                           
2 Some of these costs include: slowing growth and investment, tax diversion, biasing the provision of 
   public  goods, and inflation (Tavares  2003). 





1.3 Foreign Aid, Gender and Corruption 
The literature on the determinants of corruption utilizes various variables in the control vector.
4.  
Those who focus on the relationship between aid and corruption try to do so without controlling 
for the possible impact of gender. The impact of gender on corruption has been studied without 
controlling for foreign aid. To our knowledge, there has not been any attempt to look at the 
impact  of  both  aid  and  gender  on  corruption .  The  present  paper  tries  to  do   that.  More 
importantly, we argue that if women‟s involvement in politics helps curtail corruption and if a 
major reason for aid‟s ineffectiveness is corruption, then, foreign aid may be more effective in 
those counties with larger participation of women in politics. Accordingly, we interacted aid and 
a measure of women participation in government to capture the phenomenon.  
 
Section 2 describes the variables and discusses the data used in the paper. The empirical 
specification and the benchmark results are described in Section 3. Section 4 talks about 
robustness issues and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Variables and Data 
One of the most widely used measures of corruption is the International Country Risk Guide‟s 
(ICRG) corruption index.  This is a survey- based index with wider coverage and this is what we 
use to present our empirical results. The index takes values from zero (most corrupt) to six (least 
corrupt).  We reversed the scales so that a higher value implies a higher level of corruption.
5   An 
idea this index is meant to capture is the extent to which illegal payments are expected at low 
levels of government. This is particularly important to our work as our measure of women‟s 
involvement in government is the percentage of women in lower or single parliamentary house 
positions. 
 
The literature has identified a number of economic, socio cultural and institutional variables as 
potential  determinants  of  corruption.  However,  only  a  few  have  been  found  to  be  robust. 
Following Serra (2008), we construct our basic specification using the five variables that she 
finds to be robust determinants using “Global Sensitivity Analysis”.  These variables are per 
capita GDP (GDPpc), protestant religion (prot), colonial/legal heritage (legal), democracy, and 
political stability (stable). To these variables, we add foreign aid per capita, a measure of women 
participation in politics (percentage of women in lower or single parliamentary house positions), 
and the interaction of aid and women in parliament. Our basic specification is the following: 
 
 
                                                           
4 The conditioning variables include: GDP per capita, adult literacy, military expenditure, government  
   stability/instability, political risk rating, location, infant mortality, ethnic fractionalization,  population,  
   health care expenditure, a dummy for oil exporters, openness to trade, location dummy, government  
   expenditure and the amount of tax payments in a given developing country. For more on variables,  
    please refer to Serra (2008) and Treisman (2007). 
5 Corruption is such a hard variable to measure and most available measures of corruption capture   
   perception rather than experience. The other  two widely measures are the TI index  by transparency  
   international and the World bank‟s Control of  Corruption index. All the three  indices tend to be  
   highly correlated (Fréchett 2006). As perception may not be  a good  predictor of experience (Treisman  





Corrupti =α + β1 GDPpci +  β2 Proti + β3 legali + β4democracyi + β5stablei + β6 wparliamenti  
                +β7aidi  + β7aidi * wparliament + εi                                                                 (1)
6 
 
Generally, perceived corruption tends to decline with the development of the national economy, 
in more democratic societies that are stable. Increasing women‟s political participation may be 
valued on the basis of gender equality and other reasons. However, the impact of gender on 
corruption and whether aid is more effective in countries where more women participate in the 
political process is part of the empirical question that we try to address. The impact of foreign aid 
on corruption can either be positive or negative as implied by the reviewed literature.  
 
Data was collected as ten years average (for most variables) for 76 countries. 
7 We focus on the 
2000s, a decade that entirely falls in the post anti-corruption era.
8   A descriptive statistics for the 
main variables of interest is given in table 1. Description on all variables along with data sources 
is given in the appendix. 
 












A major concern in the gender – corruption literature that we briefly reviewed earlier is the 
omission of a measure of democracy that obscures results (Sung 2003). Moreover, continued and 
stable democracy is  more important  than short  lived democracy (Treisman  2000 and 2007). 
Accordingly, we include a measure of democracy that is an average for a long period of time 
(1975 – 2006) as a control.
9 On the other hand, a major concern in the aid-corruption literature is 
the potential endogeniety of aid.  We, therefore, instrument aid using the logs of initial values of 
                                                           
6   i indexes country  
7   These are mostly developing countries with some economies in transition; the list of countries is given in  
     the appendix. . The choice of countries is based on the availability of data.  The major exceptions  with 
     regard to ten year averages are the democracy variable which is measured as an average value for 32  
     years. This is in line with (Treisman 2007). The other variable is religion (protestant) which is given for  
     the year 1980 as used  in La Porta et al (1999). Please note that averaging variables over time helps  
      to reduce measurement error  (You and Khagram  2005). Moreover, ten year averages may be better in  
      capturing  perception ratings. For criticism on using panel data (single year) in measuring perceptions,  
      please refer to Treisman (2007).  
8     Studies have referred the „anti –corruption movement‟ beginning the 1990s (Charron  2009) 
9    For explanation of the inclusion of the other control variables, please see, among others, Swamy et al.  
      2001,Tavares 2003, Serra 2008, Treisman 2000 and 2007, and Fan et al. 2009. 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max  N 
Corrupt  2.82  0.671  1.03  4.88  76 
GDPpc  2996.61  3172.36  122.83  16737.32  76 
Prot  8.79  15.85  0  66  70 
Legal  0.263  0.443  0  1  76 
Democracy  4.73  3.52  0  10  66 
Stable  8.83  1.10  6.18  11.17  76 
Wparliament  13.02  7.01  0.42  34.59  76 
Aid  33.67  30.09  2.3  149.49  76 
Education  65.19   27.04  8.62  100  73 





infant mortality and population. These variables reflect donors‟ and recipients‟ interests and are 
commonly used in the literature (see, for example, Knack 2004). 
 
3.  Results 
 
The first column of table 2 shows OLS results for our baseline regression before we add aid or 
gender. Column two represents results when both aid and gender are added. Column three further 
adds  their  interaction  term.  The  only  variable  that  we  find  to  be  consistently  significant  in 
affecting perceived corruption in the 2000s is democracy. This captures the idea that long lived 
democracy is associated with lower perceived corruption.  Per capita GDP is significant in about 
half of the regressions and marginally looses significance in the remaining half. When we look at 
our  variables  of  interest,  neither  aid  nor  women  in  parliament  is  found  to  be  a  significant 
determinant of corruption although the coefficients on both variables appear with negative signs 
throughout. The interaction of aid and women in parliament also turns out to be insignificant.  
 
Table 2:        Foreign Aid, Women in Parliament, and Corruption (Basic Results) 
  OLS   OLS  OLS  IV(2SLS)  IV(2SLS)  Ordered 
Probit 
















































































Aid *gender      0.0004 
(0.0003) 




N  61  61  61  61  61  61 
R
2/pseudo R
2  .27  .29  0.30  .29  0.30  0.07 
     Note: Dependent variable is the ICRG corruption index. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
     Instruments in the IV estimation include log infant mortality in 2000, and log population 2000 
      (log of  initial per capita GDP used as an alternative).  * indicates significance at 10% and ** indicates  
      significance at 5%. All regressions include the constant term. 
 
 
A major concern with the OLS results, in particular the one concerning with the coefficient of 
aid, is that aid could be endogenous to corruption. We isolate the causality from aid to corruption 
from that which operates in the reverse direction by using instrumented aid
10.  As can be seen 
                                                           
10 The first stage regression (not reported here for brevity) includes the log of the initial (2000 level) values  






from columns four and five of table two, the basic results remain the same: the coefficients on 
aid and women in parliament remain negative but not significant. 
 
4. Robustness Checks 
 
As argued by Treisman (2007), corruption indices such as the ICRG‟s should not be treated as 
strictly continuous and ordered probit is more appropriate than OLS. However, in the literature 
the ratings are usually treated as interval level measures (Knack 2004). In the last column of 
table two we present our results using ordered probit regression that takes into account the issue 
of levels of measurement in variables. The results remain qualitatively the same; aid and the 
percentage of women in parliament remain unrelated to the level of perceived corruption. The 
interaction term also remains insignificant. As before, more democratic countries are associated 
with the likelihood of lower perceived corruption.
11.  
 
We also try other specifications by adding other commonly used variables  in the literature
12 
(even though they did  not pass Serra‟s (2008) sensitivity tests). These variables include: oil 
exporter  dummy  (column  2),  ethnic  fractionalization  (columns  3,  6,  and  7)
13,  government 
expenditure (column 4), and a location dummy (column 5).  As can be seen from table 3, 
successive inclusion of the variables does not change ou r basic results. Moreover, none of the 
additional controls turns out to be significant. Even some of the variables
14 that Serra (2008) has 
identified to be robust determinants of corruption lose their significance in our study.  We would 
like to point out that  our paper focuses on  the 2000s while the focus of Serra‟s paper is the 
1990s.  As  argued  by  Roodman  (2007),  fragility  in  regression  results  mainly  arises  due  to 
modifying the sample
15. On the other hand, while Serra (2008) uses the Graft Index, we use the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index by Political Risk Services. The use of 
a different measure of corruption (the dependent variable) can also be a potential explanation for 
the lack of significance in some of the variables in the control vector. The Graft index is not 
updated for the 2000s to be used in our study.  
 
Though the results are not reported for the sake of brevity, the core results stand when the 
Corruption Perception Index for 2009 by Transparency International (TI) is used as a dependent 
variable. However, we notice that the income variable becomes highly significant as in Treisman 
(2007) and the coefficient of aid becomes positive but still not significant. In all our regressions, 
the democracy variable is significant which is in line with the existing literature. 
 
 
                                                           
              
11 the signs and statistical significance of the ordered probit coefficients can be interpreted in the same way  
                  as for linear regression although they do not simply measure the marginal effect of a one-unit increase in  
                  the variable of interest on perceived corruption (Fan et al  2009). 
               
12 We add one variable at a time because of data limitation. 
               
13 The fractionalization variable is included in both IV and ordered probit estimation as the variable is very  
                  widely used in the literature. 
14 These variables refer to the proportion of the population that is protestant, legal/colonial origin, and  
      political stability (although the later shows some significance in a few regressions that we tried) 
15 Charron (2009) also points out that the time period of the study matters for the aid-corruption  
      relationship and did not find significance in all the control variables. We also note the use of robust  





Table 3:  Foreign Aid, Women in Parliament and Corruption (Robustness Checks) 
  OLS   OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV(2SLS)  Ordered 
Probit 
















































































































Oil Exporter    -0.029 
(0.202) 
         
Fraction      -0.060 
(0.347) 






      -0.007 
(0.024) 
     
Location          -0.154 
(0.202) 
   





.30   .30    . 37    .30     . 31      .37    .09 
Note: Dependent variable is the ICRG corruption index. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Instruments in the IV estimation include log infant mortality in 2000, and log population 2000 (log   
initial per capita GDP used as an alternative).  * indicates significance at 10% and ** indicates 
significance at 5%. All regressions include the constant term. 
 
To put our results in the context of the existing empirical literature, in table 4, we further present 
more robustness checks to highlight the similarities as well as the differences between our results 
(based on data for the 2000s) and earlier works. We first run two regressions where aid and 
gender enter into the model separately  and neither  variable is  found to  be significant
16  (see 
columns 1 and 2). We  then add more regional dummies than we used earlier but the results 
remain qualitatively the same (column 3).  We further checked our results using a dummy for 
former colony (column 4), education (column 5), and female labor force participation (column 7) 
and none of these variables turns out to be significant at the conventional levels , although labor 
force participation enters with the right sign. We, however, unveil an interesting finding when 
we interact aid with democracy (Column 6). We find the aid-democracy interaction term to be 




                                                           
16 Please refer to our brief review on the empirical literature which is at best mixed. 
17 We interacted democracy with women in parliament but that interaction term does not turn out to be  





Table 4: Foreign Aid, Women in Parliament and Corruption (More Robustness Checks)
18 
  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 







































































Aid  -0.002 
(0.003) 








































       
L. America      0.232 
(0.327) 
       
 
E.Europe 
     
0.379 
(0.365) 















   
Colony        0.078 
(0.191) 
     
               
Education 
 
        0.007 
(0.005) 










             
-0.0005  
(0.006) 
N   61    61     61     61      59      61    60 
R
2  .29   .29    . 35    .29     . 34      .31    .30 
Note: Dependent variable is the ICRG corruption index. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All 




                                                           
18 the use of OLS here is mainly to make our results comparable across a broad range of studies. Results  





5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper we ask if foreign aid and the percentage of women in parliament affect perceived 
corruption using data for the 2000s. We also inquire if aid is more effective in countries with a 
larger participation of  women in  parliament.  We find that neither aid nor  the percentage of 
women in parliament affects perceived corruption in a significant way.  Moreover, the impact of 
aid on corruption does not seem to be affected by the share of women in parliament. Democracy 
is the only variable that turns out to be significant in all the regressions which shows that a long 
lived democracy is associated with lower level of perceived corruption. This is in line with the 
existing  literature  and  this  may  be  a  direction  interested  parties  should  look  deeper.  The 
interaction of democracy and aid is also negative and significant implying that aid works better 
in combating corruption in long-established democracies. The income variable is found to be 
significant in the majority of the regressions and marginally loses its significance in others. Our 
results are robust to the use of various specification and estimation methods. Some points are 
worth mentioning: 
 
First, the mere increase in the percentage of women in parliament does not necessarily affect 
policy decisions. In the words of Beaman et al. (2007) “In a world where candidates care about 
electoral success and can commit to policies before elections, voter preferences, rather than the 
legislator‟s  gender identity, will determine policy outcomes. Further, if men and women are 
equally likely to vote and monitor elected officials, the implemented policies should not exhibit 
any gender bias.” Our results are consistent with Sung (2003) who argues that any correlation 
one  might  have  found  between  corruption  and  a  larger  share  of  women  in  parliament  or 
government is driven by other aspects of democratic societies.  
 
Second, we should recall that the variable “women in parliament” refers to the share of women 
in the lower house of parliament. Women representation at that level may not be as effective as 
women‟s representation at upper houses. Our choice of this variable is largely driven by the 
availability of data. 
 
Third, our review of the literature on the link between aid and corruption is at best mixed and the 
lack of a significant relationship may not be surprising. However, given the fact that we focus on 
the 2000s, an entirely post anti corruption era, our results cast doubt on the claim that aid‟s 
impact on corruption is better after the mid 1990s compared to earlier years. 
 
Finally, findings from this analysis should be interpreted cautiously. The lack of a relationship 
between  corruption  and  women  in  parliament,  for  example,  does  not  imply  that  increasing 
women‟s participation in government should not be a policy priority. What the results simply tell 
us is that a mere increase in the number of women (e.g., through a quota system) may not be 
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              Table A1:   Description and Sources of Variables used in the analysis 
Variable  Description and Source 
Corrupt  2000 to 2009 average ICRG corruption score (scales reversed).   
Source: International Country Risk Guide, Political Risk Services. www.prsgroup.com. 
 
GDPpc  2000 to 2008 average Per capita GDP. Source: World Development Indicators 
Prot  The percentage of protestant population in the country in 1980. Source: Andrei Shleifer available at 
http://economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset 
 
Legal  A dummy variable for the origin of the legal system: equals 1 if English – origin (common law); 0 
otherwise. Source: Andrei Shleifer available at http://economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset 
 
Democracy  Average democracy score from Polity IV for the years between 1975 and 2006. The democracy 
indicator is an additive eleven-point scale ranging from 0 to 10, where higher values equal a higher 
degree of institutionalized democracy.  Original source: Jaggers and Marshall (2000) and updates of 
the  Polity  IV  Database.  Our  source:  Andrei  Shleifer,  available  at 
http://economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset 
 
Stable  2000 to 2009 average level of government stability. Source: Political Risk Services (PRS) Group 
Wparliament  2000 to 2009 average percentage of women elected into the lower or single parliamentary House 
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union database available at http://www.ipu.org/english/home.htm 
Aid  2000 to 2007 average level of foreign aid received per capita .Source: World Development 
Indicators. 
Aid *wparliament  Interaction of aid and women in parliament 
Oil exporter  An oil exporter dummy that takes values  0 and 1.  
Fractionalization  measures the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to 
the same ethnolinguistic group. Source: Roodman (2004) and Andrei Shleifer (as above) 
 
Location/SSA  A location dummy. 1 for Sub Saharan Africa, 0 otherwise. 
Infant Mortality  2000 to 2008 average infant mortality per 1,000 live births Source: World development Indicators 
Population  2000 to 2008 average population. Source: World development Indicators 









Table A1:  Description and Sources of Variables used in the analysis (Continued) 
Variable  Description and Source 
L. America  A  location dummy for Central and South America 
 
E. Europe  A  location dummy for East Europe 
MENA  A location dummy for Middle East and North Africa 
 
Colony  A dummy variable for former British Colony. Source: Treisman (2007) 
 
Education  Secondary school enrollment (% gross) : “Secondary education completes the provision of basic 
education that began at the primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and 




Female Labor force participation (% of female population ages 15+): “Labor force participation rate 
is the proportion of the population ages 15 and older that is economically active”, World Bank, 







Table A2: Countries Included in the Analysis 
 
Albania  Congo, DR  Indonesia  Morocco  Slovenia 
Algeria  Cote  d‟ivoire  Jamaica  Namibia  South Africa 
Argentina  Croatia  Jordan  Nicaragua  Sri Lanka 
Armenia  Dominican Republic  Kazakhstan  Niger  Sudan 
Azerbaijan  Ecuador  Kenya  Oman  Syria 
Bahrain  Egypt  Latvia  Pakistan  Tanzania 
Bangladesh  El Salvador  Lebanon  Papua New Guinea  Togo 
Belarus  Estonia  Liberia  Paraguay  Tunisia 
Bolivia  Ethiopia  Lithuania  Peru  Turkey 
Botswana  Gabon  Madagascar  Philippines  Uganda 
Bulgaria  Ghana  Malawi  Poland  Ukraine 
Burkina Faso  Guatemala  Malaysia  Romania  Uruguay 
Cameroon  Guinea  Mali  Russia  Venezuela 
Chile  Honduras  Moldova  Senegal  Yemen 
Colombia  Hungary  Mongolia  Sierra Leone  Zambia 
       
Zimbabwe 
 
 